Izvorni znanstveni članak
The Grounding Problem for Panpsychism and the Identity Theory of Powers
Nino Kadić
; Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Sažetak
In this paper, I address the grounding problem for contemporary Russellian panpsychism, or the question of how consciousness as an intrinsic nature is connected to dispositions or powers of objects. I claim that Russellian panpsychists cannot offer an adequate solution to the grounding problem and that they should reject the claim that consciousness, as an intrinsic nature, grounds the powers of objects. Instead, I argue that they should favour the identity theory of powers, where categorical and dispositional properties are identified. I maintain that the identity theory serves as a better ontological basis for panpsychism since it avoids the grounding problem. Apart from that, I also argue that identity theory panpsychism is a position more parsimonious than Russellian panpsychism since it introduces fewer entities while successfully avoiding the grounding problem. Based on these considerations, I conclude that identity theory panpsychism is an option worth considering.
Ključne riječi
Panpsychism; grounding problem; categorical properties; dispositional properties
Hrčak ID:
195001
URI
Datum izdavanja:
11.4.2017.
Posjeta: 1.541 *