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German antiaircraft defence in Solin between March and October 1944
Ivan Matijević
orcid.org/0000-0002-9417-4698
; Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Splitu, Odsjek za povijest Poljička cesta 35, 21000 Split, Hrvatska
Sažetak
The published photographs are documenting the warpath of an anonymous member of the German air-forces (Luftwaffe) from 1942 till 1945. Between September 1942 and January 1943, he was trained in Nordhausen to operate Würzburg and Freya radars. In the German antiaircraft defence systems these radars were normally paired, because the Freya was able to discover an aircraft at a distance of 200 km and to follow it continuously, whereas at a distance of 40 km it was taken over by the Würzburg that guided the heavy antiaircraft artillery fire to it. Most probably in the former half of 1943 in Berlin he underwent an additional training in operating the Würzburg radar, and after that, in June and July, in Köthen, an additional training in operating the Freya radar. In August and September he was in Paris. In Paris were the Luftwaffe's headquarters and he was probably deployed to an antiaircraft defence unit here. After that, from 27 September till 10 October in Niš, Serbia, he was photographed next to a military installation, probably at a local airfield. He probably started his warpath in Serbia as a member of a unit of the 38th or the 40th Antiaircraft Regiment. Between 29 November 1943 and 8 January 1944 he was hospitalised in the Military Hospital in Zagreb following wounding his right lower leg.
Sometimes in the early spring of 1944 he was photographed in the village of Kučine with a number of his colleagues of the Luftwaffe. The only antiaircraft unit of the German air-forces located in Split and its surroundings was the 9th Regiment Condor with three 88 mm heavy artillery batteries, this leading to the conclusion that this is where he served. In the early 1944 this unit belonged to the 40th Flak Regiment of the 20th Flak Division, that arrived here on 18 March 1944 after several months of requests by the local German command. It may be assumed that one of its batteries, with four 88 mm cannons, was situated by the church of St. Manda, at the north-eastern slopes of Mount Marjan in Split, and two more in Solin. Four more cannons were at the locality of Buljeve kuće, about a hundred meters east of the locality of Karapašina livada, and six more south of the locality of Grubišićeve kuće, that is, in Poljaci. Possibly four cannons were situated at the Malačka Pass at Mount Kozjak, to provide antiaircraft defence of Trogir, because discussions about this had taken place with the battalion commander. According to the photographs, a part of the unit, made of a few dozens of soldiers, was located in Kučine. The efficiency of the cannons greatly depended on the Würzburg radars that also had to be brought here. The sources are saying that a Freya radar was situated in Split. The historians are saying that a large radio station was located in Kučine, east of the church of St. Luke. According to the oral testimonies, a large radar transmitter with trenches and a pillbox was at the locality of Brig, east of Kučine. It is possible that both these statements relate to the same location and the same installation, the operating of which being in charge of the antiaircraft unit photographed in Kučine in the early spring of 1944. Brig was a fine location for setting a Freya radar because it was protected from the north and at an altitude of around 200 m that enabled it an excellent view over the areas towards the Adriatic Sea and the southern Italy where the Allied Forces bombers were taking off towards their German targets in the continental Europe. The Condor Regiment's batteries were efficient in performing their tasks and irreplaceable in the German concept of defending Split and its port, and in supporting torpedo boats, especially in planning attacks on the island of Brač. A report from the German 264th Infantry Division states that on 24 May a flak shot down two Allied bombers. On the importance of the antiaircraft defence clearly wrote the German Admiral for the Adriatic Sea, Lietzman, who after the unannounced removing of the batteries from Split in the night of 3 to 4 June requested their return as soon as possible because their absence prevented united acting of different army branches and left the town undefended from the air. It was on the very 3 June, the day when the batteries were in preparations for relocation and therefore inoperable, that Split suffered Allied forces bombardment with the greatest human and material damages. This attack was directly connected with the Partisan-Allied attack on the island of Brač that began on 1 June, when the Allied forces targeted the port of Split through which the Germans could have sent their enforcements to Brač. The conclusion is reached that the Allied sent to Split a large number of aircrafts, as many as a hundred, because they were certain that no flak fire from the 9th Regiment Condor batteries could have jeopardised their task. In the mid June, the German navy command insisted that Luftwaffe return to Split one antiaircraft defence unit.
Following mid 1944, the strategic importance of Split significantly increased for the German defence of the Southeast Operative Zone, because Split had 80 antiaircraft cannons and machine guns of different calibres, that made it one of the best defended towns at the Adriatic. Photographs of the positions near the Italian pillbox at Krapašina livada, equipped with a Würzburg radar and a 20 mm cannon, indicate clearly that the antiaircraft defence of Split included also a German air-forces unit. They made use of the extraordinary characteristics of this location at a little elevation that provided an excellent control over the surrounding area in all directions. The Würzburg radar proves that in its immediate vicinity there must have existed at least one heavy artillery battery, almost certainly equipped with 88 mm cannons, with the fire observer connected by electric cables. It is probably not a coincidence that the radar was situated at this very location, just 130 m west of Buljeve kuće, next to which in April there was an antiaircraft battery of four cannons. Was one Condor's battery situated between the pillbox and Buljeve kuće until 3-4 June, to have returned there in July 1944? Or is this another unit of the 38th or the 40th Flak Regiment? As testified by a witness, a radar like this was in the field towards the locality of Karepovac. Was it situated next to the Italian pillbox at the north-western edge oif the present day Karepovac waste dumping site, and did it guide fire of the two heavy antiaircraft cannons in Kučine? These two statements could correspond to information in older literature about two batteries south of Split with four and six cannons respectively and a radio station. German antiaircraft batteries were situated in accordance with general defensive characteristics of the area and positions of other military units. Which batteries had their own radars and whether one radar guided fire of several batteries can be learned only after learning where exactly the air-force heavy cannons were situated. Now this can be claimed only about the position near the church of St. Manda in Split and about Krapašina livada, and probably about Poljaci and Kučine. In the wider area of Split antiaircraft installations were probably dispersed and mutually unconnected, same as the defence positions of other infantry units. Theoretically, one radar could have guided fire of three batteries, but since they were too distant from each other, most probably they acted independently and with their own radars and fire observers.
The unit held the position next to the pillbox at Karapašina livada as long as until the German withdrawal from Split on 24 October 1944, where after it was transported to Knin, together with the rest of the German-Ustasha forces. It is known that these forces included some smaller antiaircraft units, but nowhere in the literature did I find their names. When the Partisan forces broke these units in the so called Operation Knin, during which this soldier was wounded as well, a part of the forces obviously succeeded in escaping further north. He was among these, and on 7 December he was admitted to the hospital in Feldkirchen, Austria. Later on, on 1 February, he was deployed in a unit in Köthen, in March he was deployed to infantry, in April he withdrew to Bratislava, on 6 May he was in Styria, on 15 May he was imprisoned by the Americans, and on 17 June he returned to Munich, where he was employed with a company till 1956.
The published photographs make an extraordinary source of history, offering more possibilities of interpretation, especially related to the here cited and other written sources. Firstly these are documents from the German land and navy units acting in the wider area of Split, reports from the Allies' bombing groups stationed in southern Italy that were attacking targets around Split or flew over it on their way into the continent. No less important is searching the terrain at Bili brig that could reveal the trench system character and possibly the Freya radar's massive concrete base. The matter seeking further answers is identification of the military unit because it is clear that this soldier's warpath does not correspond to the movements of the 9th Regiment Condor. However, it should not be ruled out that he belonged to one of its smaller parts (Flakzug) that had a destiny different from that of the main unit. Other questions relate to the reasons why three Condor's batteries where taken away with no previous announcement, and this amidst the Allied-Partisan attack on Brač, also when and which unit resumed the positions at Buljeve kuće in Solin, but also at other places in and around Split.
Ključne riječi
Luftwaffe; Würzburg D radar; Freya radar; antiaircraft defence; 88 mm cannon; bunker; 9th Regiment Condor; Solin; Nordhausen; Köthen
Hrčak ID:
247966
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.2020.
Posjeta: 1.334 *