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https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.22.1.4

Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations

Marko Kardum orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-0797-6677 ; Fakultet Hrvatski studiji, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Ines Skelac orcid id orcid.org/0000-0003-4390-9161 ; Fakultet filozofije i religijskih znansoti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 94 Kb

str. 63-75

preuzimanja: 518

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Sažetak

In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logi- co-Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could un- derstand” is connected to solipsism, or the impossibility to understand other people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general lan- guage, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and de Saussure are close to this interpretation of private language.

Ključne riječi

Chomsky; general language; private language; de Saussure, solipsism; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; Wittgenstein

Hrčak ID:

250674

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/250674

Datum izdavanja:

24.1.2021.

Posjeta: 1.903 *