Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.22.1.4
Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations
Marko Kardum
orcid.org/0000-0002-0797-6677
; Fakultet Hrvatski studiji, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Ines Skelac
orcid.org/0000-0003-4390-9161
; Fakultet filozofije i religijskih znansoti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Sažetak
In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logi- co-Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could un- derstand” is connected to solipsism, or the impossibility to understand other people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general lan- guage, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and de Saussure are close to this interpretation of private language.
Ključne riječi
Chomsky; general language; private language; de Saussure, solipsism; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; Wittgenstein
Hrčak ID:
250674
URI
Datum izdavanja:
24.1.2021.
Posjeta: 1.903 *