Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1718523
Country output and financial black holes: public–private partnerships and the Laffer curve, fiscal corruption risk, and bailout rate of non-performing loans
Saisomphorn Larhsoukanh
Chengzhang Wang
Sažetak
This study develops the link between output and fiscal corruption
risk in public–private partnership (PPP) schemes and the government
bailout rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). The model
assumes that corruption is widespread in such public investment
programs. The objective functions of the government and PPP
firms include fiscal corruption risk, given that the PPP firm and
tax inspector can ‘effectively’ negotiate bribes. The model solves
for the optimal country output (i.e., aggregate productivity)
according to the Lagrange method. Long-term prospects are
introduced to solve the problem with commercial banks, as most
PPPs borrow from commercial banks. The results reaffirm that tax
policy can exacerbate the country’s output loss. Although the
equilibria between aggregate productivity and the Laffer curve
lack a direct link to fiscal corruption risk, their magnitude does
and depends on the number of PPPs. The PPP transfer from the
government in period 2 and the number of PPPs rather than government
expenditure in period 1 and the Laffer curve (tax revenues)
mainly determines the bailout rate of PPPs’ NPLs. The article
concludes with suggestions to prevent tax evasion and fiscal corruption
risk in PPP schemes by using a cluster of cooperation, and
recommends further research into cultural aspects.
Ključne riječi
public–private partnership (PPP); government rescue rate of non-performing loans (NPL); aggregate productivity; fiscal corruption risk; cluster of cooperation
Hrčak ID:
254403
URI
Datum izdavanja:
9.2.2021.
Posjeta: 438 *