Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1691930
Real earnings management and corporate governance: a study of Latin America
Cristhian Mellado
orcid.org/0000-0003-2298-1295
Paolo Saona
orcid.org/0000-0002-3151-9855
Sažetak
This article analyses the impact of ownership structure features
and institutional settings on real activities manipulation. The
analysis is based on a sample of listed companies in the underexplored
Latin American market for the period of 2004–2016. Paneldata-
based G.M.M. System Estimation is used in the empirical
analysis. The results confirm that the monitoring role of the
majority owner is crucial in mitigating managerial opportunistic
behaviour. Here, opportunistic behaviour refers to engaging in
real activities manipulation that reduces the informative content
of financial statements. However, analysis of insider ownership
revealed that managers had a negative impact on transparency.
We observed that as insider ownership increases, managers
engage more actively in real earnings management. We also find
that the institutional ownership and the quality of the regulatory
system proved to be effective mechanisms in reducing real activities
manipulation.
Ključne riječi
real activities manipulation; earnings management; corporate governance; ownership structure; institutional setting
Hrčak ID:
254592
URI
Datum izdavanja:
9.2.2021.
Posjeta: 918 *