Pregledni rad
Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation
Svan Relac
orcid.org/0000-0002-1087-4962
Sažetak
This thesis deals with Hans Kelsen’s concept of peripheral imputation, a relation established by law between material facts as legal conditions and consequences. Being a fundamental concept of his idea of legal science, this paper describes how Kelsen draws the comparison between imputation and causation, a fundamental principle of natural science that also connects material facts, albeit differently. In addition to the comparison itself, the paper discusses how Kelsen uses it to work in favor of legal science. Firstly, the difference between the two relations is used by Kelsen to justify the autonomy of legal science. After all, if it makes sense to talk about a way of relating things in the world that’s not causation, it makes sense to have a science that describes things as they’re related in this other way. Secondly, pointing to the analogies between the two relations, and consequently between legal and natural science, is supposed to prop up the legitimacy of former. For Kelsen, causal relations take the form of statements of scientific laws, so exploring this second move requires us to answer what makes scientific laws important in scientific explanation and whether this can be mimicked by imputation. The answer if far from obvious, but it’s tentatively proposed that Kelsen could make use of the idea of nomic necessity of scientific laws, as Kelsen has no trouble describing both relations as necessary in his early works. As this changes in his later works, the question arises whether Kelsen’s whole manoeuvre falls apart.
Ključne riječi
Kelsen; imputation; legal science; causation
Hrčak ID:
264061
URI
Datum izdavanja:
2.6.2021.
Posjeta: 888 *