Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.26362/20220104
Was Rawls a Kantian?
Nenad Cekić
; Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Čika Ljubina 18-20, 11000 Belgrade
Sažetak
In this article, the author evaluates whether Rawls rightly believed that his theory of justice could be interpreted as Kantian. Rawls’ Kantianism is primarily treated as the general ethical foundation of his theory of justice. Providing insight into the debate conducted on Kantian’s interpretation in the 1970s and early 1980s, the author explains the first doubts about Rawls’ Kantianism, and how Rawls’ defenders subsequently responded to them. At the center of the debate was the question of whether Rawls’ principles of justice were essentially the fruit of heteronomous rather than autonomous motivation, and whether they could be treated as “categorical imperatives.” Noting the significant differences in the conception of moral motivation between Kant and Rawls, the author explains how and why Rawls’ Kantianism is essential to the history of moral and political philosophy. Finally, the author suggests that Rawls’ Kantianism should be treated more like Kantian inspiration rather than Kantian interpretation in a literal sense.
Ključne riječi
Rawls; justice; Kantian interpretation; autonomy; heteronomy; the categorical imperative
Hrčak ID:
279144
URI
Datum izdavanja:
14.6.2022.
Posjeta: 913 *