Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.2.1
Heat and Pain Identity Statements and the Imaginability Argument
Michal Polák
orcid.org/0000-0001-9243-1753
; University of West Bohemia
Sažetak
Even after many years of empirical and conceptual research there are underlying controversies which lead scholars to dispute identity theory. One of the most influential examples is Kripke’s modal argument leading to the rejection of the claim that pain and C-fibres firing are identical. The aim of the first part of the paper is to expose that Kripke does not rigorously distinguish the meaning of individual relata entering the identity relation, and therefore his claim about the faultiness of the analogy between propositions “heat is molecular motion”, and “pain is C-fibres firing”, is mistaken. Moreover, whilst much emphasis within metaphysics of mind-brain relations has been placed upon conscious phenomenal states, it might be worthwhile to also consider cases of unconscious phenomenal states. If one admits the unconscious phenomenal states, such as unconscious pain, then, Kripke’s claim is further discredited by the fact that even pain can be individuated through its contingent property. Identity statements about pain could therefore be analogous to any other identity statements. The second part of the paper focuses on the relevance of the modal argument in confrontation with empirical evidence. It argues against the assumption embedded in the modal argument that an identical neurobiological pattern occurs regardless of whether conscious pain is present or completely absent.
Ključne riječi
identity theory; necessary and contingent statements; Kripke; unconscious phenomenality
Hrčak ID:
286320
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.2022.
Posjeta: 1.402 *