Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.26362/20220203
Defending the “claimability objection” from non-conventional arguments
Cristián Rettig
; Philosophy Department, University Adolfo Ibáñez, Diagonal Las Torres 2640 Santiago de Chile, 7941169, Chile
Sažetak
According to the well-known “claimability objection” posed by O’Neill, it is unjustified to hold that each individual has a human right to socioeconomic goods because the duty-bearers are not sufficiently determined. Even though this objection has been defended in the literature from many counter-arguments, attacks against the claimability objection based on non-conventional conceptions of human rights remain unexplored. In this paper, I aim to fill this significant gap in the philosophical literature. I defend the claimability objection from arguments that aim to undermine such an objection on the basis of non-conventional conceptions of human rights. By doing so, I reinforce the defence of the claimability objection.
Ključne riječi
Claimability objection; human right to socioeconomic goods; human rights; global justice; O’Neill
Hrčak ID:
287835
URI
Datum izdavanja:
21.12.2022.
Posjeta: 1.247 *