Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2021.1931907
Rewards and penalties in an evolutionary game theoretic model of international environmental agreements
Muhammad Luqman
Ugur Soytas
Yafei Li
Najid Ahmad
Sažetak
The UNFCC on climate change specifies that all nations must follow the rule of ‘common’ with differentiation regarding their
responsibilities for the protection of the global environmental system. Recently, the formulation and stability of the IEA have been
increased in the literature by applying the concept of game theory to make the climate agreements successful at the national
and the international level. This study provides a novel evolutionary game theoretic model of self-enforcing IEA to overcome the
free rider problem. The fundamental difference between our
paper and existing literature is that we examine enforcement
within a model as IEA has a governing authority while the typical
model of enforcement involves a government enforcing a rule
that it has imposed. For this purpose, we assign countries into different grades according to their pollution levels, consider a combination of rewards and penalties, use replicator dynamics to
derive the conditions for the population steady state, and examine how the proposed regulatory mechanism fares in this steady
state. This framework enables us to avoid the free rider and
renegotiation problems as well as the rationality assumption. We
establish the condition for evolutionary stability. The global environmental problem is managed effectively as a reward-punishment
scheme and the monitoring frequency of IEA fulfills this condition.
Our results provide an allocation principal with stable conditions
under which countries get more benefits by monitoring the IEA
and stability of the grand coalition holds.
Ključne riječi
Free-rider problem; international environmental agreements; pollution control; evolutionary game theory
Hrčak ID:
301848
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.3.2023.
Posjeta: 174 *