Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2021.1981962
Government regulation of emergency supplies under the epidemic crisis
Junlong Chen
Chaoqun Sun
Ruihan Zhang
Jiali Liu
Sažetak
This paper constructs a multi-oligopoly model of emergency supplies and analyses the market equilibrium results under normal
conditions and epidemic conditions. The impacts of the degree of
change in market demand, externalities, the material cost of
emergency supplies and government regulation on the equilibrium results, especially on the prices of emergency supplies, are
discussed. The results show that an increase in material cost will
lead to low output and social welfare and a high price, under
either normal conditions or epidemic conditions. Moreover, under
epidemic conditions, the degree of change in market demand,
externalities, material cost and the presence and mode of government regulation all have multiple and complex influences on the
equilibrium results. Under epidemic conditions, both government
output and price regulation can increase the supply of emergency
supplies. In addition, when market demand changes drastically,
consumer surplus and social welfare can be enhanced by the
implementation of regulations. Particularly, price regulation is
more effective when there is a high material cost.
Ključne riječi
Epidemic crisis; emergency supplies; government regulation; oligopoly
Hrčak ID:
302485
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.3.2023.
Posjeta: 344 *