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https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2021.1985569

Behavioural investigation of the impact of different types of CEOs on innovation in family firms: moderating role of ownership divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights

Sadeen Ghafoor
Man Wang
Shihua Chen
Rao Zhang
Muhammad Zulfiqar


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 2.256 Kb

str. 2906-2929

preuzimanja: 141

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Sažetak

In what way different types of CEOs within family firms, based on
control diversity, behave towards R&D investment and how excess
voting rights alter this behaviour of CEOs? This study has aimed
to investigate the R&D investment behaviour of CEOs in family
firms. This study has also investigated the moderating role of
ownership divergence. The Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS)
regression method is applied for data analysis purpose. Moreover,
the Tobit regression model is also applied for robustness check.
We obtained data (2008–2018) on Chinese A-share firms from
CSMAR. The study found non-family CEOs exhibit negative behaviour towards R&D investment and that CEOs from family firms
exhibit the same behaviour when do not have actual control
rights. Family CEOs with actual control rights are more willing to
R&D investment. The moderating effect of excess voting rights on
family CEOs with actual control rights who change their willingness from positive to negative. The non-family CEOs and family
CEOs without actual control rights show positive behaviour with
existence of excess voting rights. This study is novel and pioneered the exploration of effects of different types of CEOs within
family firms on R&D investment behaviour. This study is useful for
directors to understand and select a suitable CEO for their firm,
also for managers to devise an optimal level of ownership discrepancy to attain maximum benefits from R&D investment decisions.

Ključne riječi

CEOs types; family firms; R&D; voting rights; cash flow rights

Hrčak ID:

302490

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/302490

Datum izdavanja:

31.3.2023.

Posjeta: 226 *