Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2052331
Equity pledge of controlling shareholders, property right structure and enterprise innovation efficiency: evidence from Chinese firms
Guangqian Ren
Yifan Mo
Li Liu
Minna Zheng
Liying Shen
Sažetak
The innovation efficiency of an enterprise is subject to the behavior
of the innovation subject, while the equity pledge behavior of
the controlling shareholder not only brings convenience for
innovation investment and financing, but also brings risks which
has an impact on the innovation output of the enterprise. In this
paper, we investigate how equity pledge of controlling shareholders
affect the enterprise innovation efficiency using the data of
China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2020, and examine
the effect of property right structure on the relationship between
them from the two dimensions of equity nature and equity concentration.
We find that equity pledge of controlling shareholders
are signifcantly negatively related to innovation efficiency, meaning
that equity pledge inhibits the innovation behavior of enterprises
and reduces the innovation efficiency. We further provide
evidence to show that the impediment effect of equity pledge of
controlling shareholder on enterprise innovation efficiency is
more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and decentralized
equity enterprises. Moreover, our analysis shows that different
equity concentration levels have different effects in the
process of equity pledge affecting enterprise innovation efficiency
and the effect of concentrated equity enterprises is lower than
that of decentralized enterprises.
Ključne riječi
Equity pledge of controlling shareholders; property right structure; equity nature; equity concentration; innovation efficiency
Hrčak ID:
302987
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.3.2023.
Posjeta: 331 *