Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2113738
The proportion of state-owned shares and capacity sharing with constraints and prices in a mixed oligopoly
Zheng Fu
Bo Xu
Xiaomeng Wang
Chaoqun Sun
Junlong Chen
Sažetak
This study constructs an oligopoly model composed of mixed-ownership
and private enterprises, examining the equilibrium results of
three cases: when two enterprises compete with sufficient capacity
(Model AA), insufficient capacity and overcapacity coexist without
sharing (Model IA), and sharing (Model IS). This study also explores
the effects of the proportion of state-owned shares, capacity constraints,
and capacity prices. The realisation conditions and impacts
of capacity sharing are further analysed. The results show that the
efficiency of state-owned capital affects the effects of state-owned
shares on the equilibrium results. An optimal capacity price exists
for the capacity provider (private enterprise). Capacity sharing can
effectively allocate resources and increase profits; however, consumers
and society do not necessarily benefit from it. Full privatisation
and the highest proportion of state-owned shares may be the
best choice for the government under certain conditions. The government
can intervene in enterprises’ capacity decision-making
through subsidies to promote social welfare and realise capacity
sharing simultaneously. Moreover, the government subsidises different
enterprises when the proportions of state-owned shares and
capacity prices are within different ranges.
Ključne riječi
mixed-ownership; proportion of state-owned shares; oligopoly; capacity sharing; government subsidies; digital economy
Hrčak ID:
306451
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.3.2023.
Posjeta: 333 *