Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2120515
Does compensative subsidy alleviate pollutant emission and improve welfare under crossindustry pollution?
Po-Sheng Ko
Chien-Shu Tsai
Jen-Yao Lee
Sažetak
This paper establishes a cross-industry pollution externality model
under centralized labor union. In delineating the motivations of a
benevolent government, it might be possible to tax part of the
welfare gains and use the revenue to compensate the affected
polluting industry for the damage costs, thereby improving welfare.
We show that the magnitude of marginal pollution plays a
critical role. When the marginal pollution is large, the government
should tax the pollution firm to reduce the pollution. However,
when the marginal pollution is small, the government should subsidize
the polluted firm to increase output and enhance consumer
surplus.
Ključne riječi
Production externality; centralized union; emission tax; compensative subsidy
Hrčak ID:
306471
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.3.2023.
Posjeta: 120 *