Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2023.2177697
Independent director network, agency costs and stock price crash risk
Xiao-Li Gong
Yi-Wei Li
Jin-Yan Lu
Yong-Kang Feng
Sažetak
It is of great significance to improve the corporate governance structure
to study whether independent directors play the role of ‘vase’ in
the governance of listed companies. Based on the social network
theory, this article constructs the social network formed by interlocking
independent directors and examines the influence of independent
director network on stock price crash risk. The mechanism test
analyses the mediating effect of principal–agent problem and large
shareholder’s tunnelling on stock price crash risk. The empirical
research shows that the higher the network centrality of the company’s
independent directors, the lower the stock price crash risk.
The independent director network can restrain the company’s stock
price crash risk by reducing two types of agency costs. Further
research finds that the influence of independent director network on
stock price crash risk is more pronounced in companies with unreasonable
ownership structure, poor internal governance and weak
external supervision. The research conclusions have important implications
for listed companies to reduce the risk of stock price crash
and maintain the stability of the capitalmarket.
Ključne riječi
Independent director network; stock price crash risk; principal–agent problem; large shareholder’s tunnelling
Hrčak ID:
306849
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.4.2023.
Posjeta: 141 *