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https://doi.org/10.52685/pihfb.52.1(103).3

Zimmermann’s Early Doctrine of Epistemic States

Dario Škarica orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-6788-2242 ; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska; Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Splitu, Split, Hrvatska


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 358 Kb

verzije

str. 47-77

preuzimanja: 0

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Sažetak

This paper presents and comments on Zimmermann’s early views on epistemic states (such as doubt, opinion, and certainty). The main conclusions drawn are as follows: first, Zimmermann’s early considerations on epistemic states are at least partially informed by the distinction between real and objective (epistemic) truth; second, Zimmermann holds epistemic reasons to be both objective criteria of truth and objective motives of (epistemic) assent; third, Zimmermann’s definitions of doubt, opinion, and certainty are both epistemological and psychological in nature.

Ključne riječi

Stjepan Zimmermann; doubt; opinion; certainty; truth; justification

Hrčak ID:

346881

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/346881

Datum izdavanja:

5.5.2026.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

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