Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.56550/d.4.2.2
The Real and the Ideal as Hermeneutic Principles in Schelling’s Freedom Essay
Matthew Nini
orcid.org/0009-0005-5197-4707
; Institut za filozofiju Zagreb
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* Dopisni autor.
Sažetak
This paper offers a comprehensive interpretation of F.W.J. Schelling’s 1809 Freedom Essay. It does so by claiming that the Freedom Essay can be read as a protracted dialogue between two philosophical principles, Realism and Idealism. While these are not new terms for Schelling, they achieve new significance in 1809. Moving away from the static Absolute principle of the Identity Philosophy, Schelling sees a productive tension between realism and idealism, signified at the broadest level by the logical principles of Identity and Sufficient Reason. The quest for a reconciliation of these principles will lead to the search for a Higher Realism that stands above realism and idealism, and integrates both logical principles, shown by the Ungrund as a substratum according to which particulars are infolded or unfolded. Metaphysically, this will be represented by two principles in God: the idealist Existirendes Wesen and the realist Grund seiner Existenz. While theoretically, these will remain balanced, Schelling’s application of the dynamic pair to moral philosophy will be problematic: particularly in the Intelligible Deed, Schelling will overdetermine the idealist side, moving too far away from the factical world. The solutions to this, applied in this paper, will be to interpret the Freedom Essay section by section, sometimes reading Schelling contra Schelling in order to balance the two principles.
Ključne riječi
German Idealism; F.W.J. Schelling; Freedom Essay (Freiheitsschrift); Theodicy; Pantheism Controversy
Hrčak ID:
347646
URI
Datum izdavanja:
18.5.2026.
Posjeta: 147 *