Police and Security, Vol. 35 No. 3, 2026.
Review article
https://doi.org/10.59245/ps.35.3.4
Borovo Selo 1991: Urban Ambush and the Tactical Failure of a Security System in Transition
Ivan Galović
; Program of European Studies at Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek
Abstract
This article analyses the conflict in Borovo Selo on 2 May 1991 as a case study of urban ambush, tactical failure, and the institutional unpreparedness of a security system in transition. It proceeds from the hypothesis that the heavy losses suffered by Croatian police forces resulted not solely from the intensity of the adversary’s actions, but from a mismatch between police doctrine, the actual conditions on the ground, and the requirements of combat in a prepared urban ambush. By applying the METT-TC(I), OAKOC, TCCC, and DOTMLPF-I frameworks, the article examines the strategic context, intelligence assessment, ambush geometry, collapse of command and control, tactical-medical limitations, and systemic capability shortfalls within the Ministry of the Interior. Particular attention is paid to the unarmoured police column, the linear urban environment, the adversary’s fire superiority, the unfavourable force ratio, and the selective conduct of the Yugoslav People’s Army. The article shows that Borovo Selo was not only a tragic event from the early phase of the Homeland War, but also an early doctrinal lesson on the operational consequences of institutional unpreparedness. It concludes that action against an entrenched adversary in an urban environment requires intelligence preparation, protected mobility, fire support, combined action, reliable communications, and pre-planned tactical-medical support.
Keywords
Borovo Selo; urban ambush; tactical failure; DOTMLPF-I; tactical-medical support
Hrčak ID:
351011
URI
Publication date:
21.9.2026.
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