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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING: BUCHANAN’S AND TULLOCK’S CONTRIBUTION
Zdravko Petak
; Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
The author looks into the methodological features of public choice theory. On the example of James Buchanan’s contribution, he demonstrates the differences between that kind of approach (often dubbed political economy) versus welfare economics and mainstream economics. Unlike welfare economics, which tries to work out the optimal state of allocation and distribution of economic resources by using certain logical rules based on Pareto’s principles, or mainstream economics, which tries to identify the improvements in observable economic categories (such as national income or investment consumption), political economy encompasses the process of collective decision-making i.e. politics. In this, the efficacy criterion is the extent of consent (consensus) in collective decision-making. On the example of Buchanan’s and Tullock’s joint contribution in the book The Calculus of Consent, the author concludes that this paved the way for introducing a legitimate categorial mechanism for investigating the costs of political decision-making into political science.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
31969
URI
Datum izdavanja:
9.9.1999.
Posjeta: 3.121 *