Prethodno priopćenje

PROBLEM OF ENSURING MAXIMUM LEVEL OF WORKERS' EFFORT

Đuro Benić orcid.org/0000-0002-0695-5815 ; Sveučilište u Dubrovniku, Odjel za ekonomiju i poslovnu ekonomiju

Sažetak

One of the conditions of running business on the curve of long-term average cost is the insurance of a maximum worker's effort, which becomes very important when having in mind frequent interest clashes among workers, managers and company owners. The paper analyzes the principal-agent problem, i.e. the problem of a maximum workers' effort. The paper also examines how to use contracts, i.e. schemes and plans of compensations and payments that ensure for all the employees their maximum work effort. Stimulus systems, analyzed in cases of symmetric and asymmetric information, are particularly emphasized.

Ključne riječi

principal; agent; incentive systems; symmetric and asymmetric information

Hrčak ID:

39277

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/39277

Datum izdavanja:

15.7.2009.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 3.554 *