Izvorni znanstveni članak
Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism
Davor Pećnjak
orcid.org/0000-0001-9506-053X
; Institut za filozofiju, Ul. grada Vukovara 54, 10000 Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
In this article I defend Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism in O’Connor’s version against several objections raised by David Widerker. More specifically, I try to show that we can overcome difficulties raised by the question whether an agent has a control over controlling doing action E, by objection of possible nomically sufficient condition for obtaining of E and by objection of possible logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for obtaining of E.
Ključne riječi
Agent-causal libertarianism; control; logically sufficient condition; nomically sufficient condition; strong agent-causal libertarianism
Hrčak ID:
60843
URI
Datum izdavanja:
22.11.2010.
Posjeta: 1.646 *