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Folk psychology is not a metarepresentational device

Tamás Demeter ; Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Berlin

Sažetak

Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folk-psychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention to the central role of rationality, the conceptual connections, and the essential evaluative content inherent in folk psychological ascriptions. As a conclusion I propose that a fictionalist account of the discourse would fit its characteristics better than a factualist- realist interpretation.

Ključne riječi

folk psychology; mental fictionalism; rationality; metarepresentation

Hrčak ID:

63460

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/63460

Datum izdavanja:

1.12.2009.

Posjeta: 1.333 *