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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 5 No. 2, 2009.

Izvorni znanstveni članak

Why phenomenal content is not intentional

Howard Robinson ; Central European University

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 121 Kb

str. 79-93

preuzimanja: 799

citiraj

Sažetak

I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.

Ključne riječi

intentionality; perception; phenomenal content; sensation

Hrčak ID:

63464

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/63464

Datum izdavanja:

1.12.2009.

Posjeta: 1.469 *