Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.26362/20180201
Circularity without Ignorance: a Moorean account of the limitations of Moore’s Argument
Dean H. Chapman
orcid.org/0000-0003-0250-6251
; University of Cape Town – Department of Philosophy, Room 3.03, Neville Alexander Building, University Avenue, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7700, South Africa
Abstract
I argue that Moore’s Argument is limited in that it is viciously circular relative to four different aims. The argument is not useful for achieving those aims. But Mooreanism is true. That is, I argue that Moore’s Argument can give us knowledge of its conclusion. These elements of the view account for the common intuition that the argument is problematically circular. They account for the fact that there is a plausibly sound argument for Mooreanism. And they position me to explain the common intuition that Mooreanism makes it implausibly easy to know that we are not deceived in all of our external world beliefs: we commonly conflate the claim of Mooreanism with stronger claims implying that Moore’s Argument is more useful than it actually is. Appreciating the considerable modesty of the Moorean’s view is crucial for understanding why the view is true. Then I defend the anti-sceptical importance of the truth of Mooreanism, compatibly with the considerable modesty of
the Moorean’s claim. Finally I argue that this account – of the power and limitations of Moore’s Argument – is superior to three other prima facie good competitors.
Keywords
Conservatism; easy knowledge; epistemic circularity; neo-Mooreanism; scepticism; vicious circularity; Wittgenstein.
Hrčak ID:
212750
URI
Publication date:
25.6.2018.
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