Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.19.2.1
Are there “Moral” Judgments?
David Sackris
orcid.org/0000-0002-3914-3311
; Arapahoe Community College
Rasmus Larsen Rosenberg
; University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.
Keywords
metaethics, moral judgment, judgment, ontology
Hrčak ID:
301126
URI
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