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Original scientific paper

Are there “Moral” Judgments?

David Sackris orcid id ; Arapahoe Community College
Rasmus Larsen Rosenberg ; University of Toronto, Mississauga

Full text: english pdf 317 Kb

page S1-23

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Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.


metaethics, moral judgment, judgment, ontology

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Article data in other languages: croatian

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