Original scientific paper

Controlling the Control and Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism

Davor Pećnjak orcid.org/0000-0001-9506-053X ; Institute of Philosophy, Ul. grada Vukovara 54, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia

Abstract

In this article I defend Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism in O’Connor’s version against several objections raised by David Widerker. More specifically, I try to show that we can overcome difficulties raised by the question whether an agent has a control over controlling doing action E, by objection of possible nomically sufficient condition for obtaining of E and by objection of possible logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for obtaining of E.

Keywords

Agent-causal libertarianism; control; logically sufficient condition; nomically sufficient condition; strong agent-causal libertarianism

Hrčak ID:

60843

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/60843

Publication date:

22.11.2010.

Article data in other languages: croatian

Visits: 2.229 *