Original scientific paper

Metaphysical Minimalism

Fritz J. McDonald orcid.org/0000-0002-7830-9441 ; Department of Philosophy, Oakland Universit, USA

Abstract

Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A minimalist theory of properties and facts explains these matters in terms of the acceptance of trivial schemas. To make the case that minimalism is a superior approach to properties and facts, I argue against the standard views in the philosophical literature. I argue that the minimalist approach to properties has advantages over realism, nominalism, and the trope theory. I argue that the minimalist approach to facts is superior to the standard treatment of facts on correspondence theories. Metaphysical minimalism, a minimalist metaphysics of properties and facts, is a distinct and superior alternative to the theories of properties and facts currently on offer.

Keywords

Facts; metaphysics; minimalism; truth

Hrčak ID:

68309

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/68309

Publication date:

30.5.2011.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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