Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?

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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 8 No. 2, 2012.

Original scientific paper

Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?

Vassilios Livanios ; University of Athens

Full text: english pdf 128 Kb

page 30-38

downloads: 401

APA 6th Edition

Livanios, V. (2012). Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 8 (2), 30-38. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267

MLA 8th Edition

Livanios, Vassilios. "Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 2, 2012, pp. 30-38. https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267. Accessed 22 Dec. 2024.

Chicago 17th Edition

Livanios, Vassilios. "Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2012): 30-38. https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267

Harvard

Livanios, V. (2012). 'Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 8(2), pp. 30-38. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267 (Accessed 22 December 2024)

Vancouver

Livanios V. Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2012 [cited 2024 December 22];8(2):30-38. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267

IEEE

V. Livanios, "Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.8, no. 2, pp. 30-38, 2012. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267. [Accessed: 22 December 2024]

Abstract

In this paper I critically examine the most recent gauge-theoretic argument against the intrinsicality of fundamental properties formulated by French and McKenzie (2012). I show that it cannot achieve its intended goal (which is to undermine Lewis’s neo-Humean metaphysical project) but it can have a signifi cant influence to dispositional essentialists that hold that the fundamental physical properties are intrinsic features of their bearers.

Keywords

intrinsic properties; gauge theory; local symmetries; gauge bosons

Hrčak ID:

98267

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/98267

Publication date:

1.2.2013.

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