Original scientific paper
Managing Crisis in the Eurozone
Luka Brkić
; Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Kristijan Kotarski
orcid.org/0000-0001-9500-6760
; Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Abstract
Euro crisis displayed its full blow in the spring of 2010. Its dynamics revealed
deep-seated structural flaws at the core of the EMU. The productive Germany
is tied via the euro currency union to countries that have lower productivity
rates and inefficient economies. This union has been beneficial to the countries
of Southern Europe so far since EMU inception, as it provided them with
cheap credit. EMU showcased its problematic institutional design. Compared
to mature federations, the institutional design of EMU is incomplete. On the
one hand, there is a strong ECB that decides monetary policies for the entire
euro area. At the same time, there is a lack of macroeconomic policy coordination
for the same area. The budgetary and fiscal policies are set by governments
of national states. This is of great concern for the vitality and robustness
of the EMU in the context of soft constraints imposed by the Stability
and Growth Pact. In the first part, this paper will highlight basic structural
problems that led to the current crisis of confidence in the common European
currency. The second part intends to discuss the lack of monetary and
fiscal policy coordination, while the third part analyzes monetary and fiscal
responses to the crisis by the EU institutions and national actors. The fourth
part seeks to portray some possibilities for overcoming deep-seated structural
imbalances, and questions the likelihood of “gouvernement économique” as a
new stage in European integration.
Keywords
euro; financial crisis; monetary policy; fiscal policy; ECB; economic governance
Hrčak ID:
68077
URI
Publication date:
10.5.2011.
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