Original scientific paper
Bošković's and Kant's Philosophy of Nature
Genoveva Slade
; Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest filozofije,Zagreb, Hrvatska
Abstract
Bošković and Kant develop a similar theory using repulsive and attractive forces, so it is possible to presume that Kant made use of Bošković's Theory of Natural Philosophy. In his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant distinguishes within the metaphysics of nature between its pure, transcendental part and the special metaphysics of nature. The transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature deals with laws that make possible the concept of nature in general, regardless of some specific object of experience, undefined, therefore as to the nature of any thing of the sensible world. Special metaphysics, as opposed to this, deals with the special nature of certain specific classes of things. It is either the metaphysics of psychology or the metaphysics of .physics, depending on whether one is discussing intellectual or physical nature, i.e. such as the metaphysics of physical nature .in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this manner it applies the principles of the transcendental part to two classes of sensible objects. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science start from the concept of nature as the totality of things in as much as they can be the object of senses, therefore experience, thinking in this case, of the entirety of phenomenality, i.e. the sensible world with exclusion of all non-sensible things. The transcendental part of metaphysics deals exclusively with laws that make possible the concept of nature tin general. Although this transcendental part of metaphysics does not delve deeper into differences, that exist between objects of the external and internal senses, although does deal, without relation to any specific experiential object, just with the laws, that make the concept of nature possible at all, it does study those very laws and concepts of nature exclusively in their relation to experiential objects and in relation to things of the sensible world. In the philosophy of nature, Kant distinguishes between rational and empirical physics and psychology. Rational nonexperiential physics is either pure or applied. The object of the first are external phenomena in general, and its principles are conditions of phenomena in general, while special external phenomenal objects are relevant to the second, but its principles are a priori. They both constitute .the metaphysics of nature. Kant, according to Hoppe, does not use the word »transcendental« univalently. Although he expressly states: the transcendental and the transcendent are not one and the same (The Critique, B 352) he uses transcendental in the sense of the transcendent, i.e. in the sense: transcendental usage, i.e. usage, that goes .beyond the order of experience (The Critique, B 353). Then: transcendental i.e. a foundation for' organization of the world which is only conceivable to pure reason as distinct from the world, and its interaction (Critique, B 723/724). In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, transcendental is used in the sense of what relates to the conditions of the possibility of experience (Hoppe, Kants Theorie der Physik, pp. 33-34). The transcendental part of metaphysics is therefore not any sort of ontology in the traditional, precritical sense. The special metaphysics of physical nature explores a special class of objects for which an experiential concept is given, but such that aside from what •lies in •that concept, no other experiential principle is used for its cognition. The experiential concept lying alt the foundation of the special metaphysics of physical nature is matter. Matter is what moves through space (phoroomy), what fills space (dynamics) and what, as such, has the force of motion (mechanics). The empirical concept of matter has predicates of motion, filling of space and impenetrability so that it could be a given object of external sense. This experiential notion of substances produces extensive nature in general so it is therefore possible to dissect the concept of matter according to category and constitute extensive nature. Since the principles of pure reason apply primarily to extensive nature, they do not differ in this sense a priori from the cognitions that the special metaphysics of extensive nature attains, if it is only distinguished from the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature by the fact that its objects are extensive. In Metaphyisal Foundations, Kant states that general metaphysics, whenever it needs examples, therefore intuitions, in order to provide pure concepts of reason with meaning, must extract them from the general science of the body (Körperlehre), therefore from the form and principle of external intuition, for it is empty without their concepts. However, general metaphysics is not a transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, for Kant holds back from a general system of metaphysics which would attain that which goes beyond all limits of experience. A general non-critical metaphysics can only be reatized in its concepts are brought into relation with external viewpoints. As opposed to the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, Metaphysical Foundations are not seeking conditions for the possibility of experience of nature is general, not even of extensive nature in .general but, how to us can nature be given, whose general laws are already known since as such, with the categories and principles of pure reason they are constituted. Only through movement of external senses can they be affected. For this reason Metaphysical Foundations starts from definition of matter as 'motion in space. But this definition of the concept of matter is not achieved by applying the transcendental principle, especially not through application o category. It is therefore questionable whether the concept of motion is at all objectively valid for matter. This notion can not be a priori proven. Since without motion there can be no awareness or experience, it seems that it must be a priori postulated although it can not be considered in its possibility as an empirical concept. This unsatisfactory empirical beginning also applies to the status of moving forces, the introduction of which is primarily necessary due to the possibility of applyng mathematics to external objects, which, however, also pass from the concept of motion as the fundamental determination of all external objects. Forces such as motion can not be explained any further. Especially since with them it is not possible to a priori exclude an atomistic explanation of nature. Atomism simply loses its property of being the only possible theory for explaining impenetrability according to Kant in Metaphysical Foundations.
But –moving forces of dynamism remain mere hypotheses which can only justify application of the mathematics that these forces make possible. As to metaphysics, however, since it can not guarantee forces of motion a priori, its task of enabling and realizing a transition to the mathematical natural science has failed. In Spite of the claim and argument that it is possible, with the help of forces, to found the natural science of mathematics, Kant oscillates as to whether matter, when it is transformed into the elementary forces of repulsion an attraction, could actually be constituted. Metaphysical Foundations do not provide an answer to the question of how the laws of experience upon which physics is based are possible through their pure part.
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Hrčak ID:
87502
URI
Publication date:
2.12.1985.
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