Original scientific paper
Portrait of the Eu as a Rational Agent: Collective Reason and Democratic Deficit
Vesco Pascalev
Abstract
In the present article I take a critical view of the well-known
discursive dilemma which captures the difference between governance
by collective reasoning and governance responsive to majoritarian
will. I identify a problem with the solution preferred by the republican
theory which I call the rationality gap and suggest that in
principle deliberation in the public sphere may bring the two ends together,
thus avoiding the gap. Then I look at the European Union (EU)
through the prism of civic republicanism and analyse it as an example
of a system which collectivises reason. From such a perspective, the
notorious democratic deficit is explainable as a contradiction between
collective reason and popular will. In principle, pan-European deliberation
could close the gap there, too. However, it is obstructed by competition
from spontaneous deliberation in the existing national public
spheres. The latter are more robust and for that reason the rationality
gaps arising there are closed faster so that national public opinions
polarise and defend ‘national’ interest against further deliberative
challenges at the upper level. I argue that the notion of competition is
useful to explain why, despite the development of common democratic
institutions at the EU level and despite the emergence of a weak pan-
European public, the deficit is bound to persist.
Keywords
Hrčak ID:
131641
URI
Publication date:
17.12.2014.
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