Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2017.1383170
Examining agency governance in the European Union financial sector – a case-study of the European Securities and Markets Authority
Ivana Bajakić
; Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
Marta Božina Beroš
; Faculty of Economics and Tourism, Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Pula, Croatia
Abstract
Ever since the outset of the financial crisis of 2009, agencies have
emerged as key actors of European Union (EU) financial sector
governance. As an organisational form that can be insulated from
national political pressures, and committed to the Union interest,
agencies proliferated in the financial sector ushering the agencification
trend in finance. In this sense, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) – as part of the European Supervisory Authorities
– practically embodies this trend. ESMA presents a radical shift
in financial markets’ governance due to the nature of its soft law
regulations and the direct impact it exerts on addressees’ behaviour in
emergency circumstances. But ESMA’s success in optimising financial
sector governance largely depends on its legitimacy, which is centred
on independence. At the same time independence demands wider
participation and inclusiveness of the decision-making process. This
is not easy to achieve in a complex system with multiple stakeholders
as is the governance of the EU financial sector (e.g., EU institutions,
national actors, private sector). This paper examines ESMA’s
interinstitutional relations and independence in light of publicly
voiced criticism. We find that ESMA’s main executive bodies are still
susceptible to influences by Member States as well as EU institutions
(i.e., Commission), which undermines its operational independence.
Keywords
Agency governance; ESMA; Independence
Hrčak ID:
193209
URI
Publication date:
1.12.2017.
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