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Conference paper


Hans Vorländer ; Institut fuer Politikwissenschaft, Technische Universitaet Dresden, Dresden, Germany

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The author analyses the feasibility of the call for a European constitution. It is thought that there is something that may be called the European constitutional principles as defined in various agreements and also a legal and institutional system that derives its validity and viability from those agreements. Although the Treaties of Rome do not include an explicit catalogue of fundamental rights, they nevertheless guarantee four economic freedoms: the freedom of movement of people, goods, capital and services. However, the character of the European Union as a legal community is based on individual constitutions. Two questions arise from this: first, the member-countries remain the masters of the integration, which makes the EU more similar to the late medieval legal condition of partial juridization of political rule than a community with a modern constitution. Second, the European Union does not have pouvoir constituant. This fact has been criticized by the advocates of the idea of a European constitution who think that the EU needs a constitution that is to establish and maintain links among its citizens. According to them, this would represent the initial impetus for the political community. The author concludes that a European constitution will but pave the way for the institutions that create a feeling of togetherness or unity of the citizens. On the other hand, one should not expect anything less.


European Union, European Constitution, nation-states, constitution

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