Extended Self and Identity over Time
; Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
Marina Novina orcid.org/0000-0001-7926-8330 ; Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
APA 6th Edition
Grgić, A. & Novina, M. (2021). Extended Self and Identity over Time. Disputatio philosophica, 23 (1), 65-76. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4
MLA 8th Edition
Grgić, Ana and Marina Novina. "Extended Self and Identity over Time." Disputatio philosophica, vol. 23, no. 1, 2021, pp. 65-76. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4. Accessed 4 Dec. 2022.
Chicago 17th Edition
Grgić, Ana and Marina Novina. "Extended Self and Identity over Time." Disputatio philosophica 23, no. 1 (2021): 65-76. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4
Grgić, A., and Novina, M. (2021). 'Extended Self and Identity over Time', Disputatio philosophica, 23(1), pp. 65-76. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4
Grgić A, Novina M. Extended Self and Identity over Time. Disputatio philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [cited 2022 December 04];23(1):65-76. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4
A. Grgić and M. Novina, "Extended Self and Identity over Time", Disputatio philosophica, vol.23, no. 1, pp. 65-76, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4
In this paper, we discuss the Extended Self Hypothesis proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers, and address the objection that the extended self lacks stability and continuity needed to be considered identical over time. We try to show that such an objection is untenable. We also discuss the view according to which another type of self, i.e., the narrative self, can also be seen as extended, and argue that stability and continuity of this type of self is also not threatened by its extension beyond the boundaries of person’s body. Hence, at least as far as these types of self are concerned, there is no need to confine ourselves to the internalized self when thinking about the problems of personal identity.
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