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Professional paper

https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.23.1.4

Extended Self and Identity over Time

Ana Grgić orcid id orcid.org/0000-0003-0874-244X ; Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
Marina Novina orcid id orcid.org/0000-0001-7926-8330 ; Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia


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Abstract

In this paper, we discuss the Extended Self Hypothesis proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers, and address the objection that the extended self lacks stability and continuity needed to be considered identical over time. We try to show that such an objection is untenable. We also discuss the view according to which another type of self, i.e., the narrative self, can also be seen as extended, and argue that stability and continuity of this type of self is also not threatened by its extension beyond the boundaries of person’s body. Hence, at least as far as these types of self are concerned, there is no need to confine ourselves to the internalized self when thinking about the problems of personal identity.

Keywords

David Chalmers, Andy Clark, extended self, identity over time, narrative self, self

Hrčak ID:

272108

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/272108

Article data in other languages: croatian

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