Technical gazette, Vol. 29 No. 6, 2022.
Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20220817070447
Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy
Yu Shi
; School of Management, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 050043, Hebei Province, China
Hui Wang
; School of Management, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 050043, Hebei Province, China
Shuai Di
; Hebei Logistics Jianlong Co., Ltd, Shijiazhuang 050000, Hebei Province, China
Long Chen
; State Key Laboratory of Mechanical Behavior and System Safety of Traffic Engineering Structure, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 050043, Hebei Province, China
Abstract
Intermodal road-rail transportation (IRRT) integrates the advantages of railways and roads to achieve a win-win situation for all participants. However, the interest game problem of IRRT affects the enthusiasm of each sub-carrier to cooperate, which makes it difficult to show its advantages in the competition with the truck-only transport (TOT), and then retards the promotion process of the multimodal transport industry. In order to improve the competitiveness of IRRT, based on Stackelberg game and low-carbon policy, the interest coordination problem of supply chain composed of road transport enterprises (RTE), railway transport enterprises (RWTE) and multimodal transport operators (MTO) is studied under the background of the TOT's competition. The RESULTS SHOW THAT THE active intervention of the local government has a significant promotion effect on the profits of the RTE and the RWTE under the decentralized decision mode, while the profits of the MTO show a trend of decreasing first and then increasing.
Keywords
carbon emissions; game theory; government intervention; interest game; IRRT supply chain
Hrčak ID:
284921
URI
Publication date:
29.10.2022.
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