Original scientific paper
BETWEEN ETHOS OF PROFESSION AND PARTY LOYALTY: DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENTS ON THEIR OWN AFFAIRS
Josef Isensee
; Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Deutschland
Abstract
The author’s starting point is Locke’s classical thesis that the rulers and the ruled are subject to universal laws and that their abuses are prevented by the institutional means of power sharing. The rule according to which nobody can be a judge in their own affairs unconditionally applies in all court or administrative proceedings. The problem arises when this legal thinking is applied to parliaments. Namely, in parliamentary work the incompatibility of the mandates of the legislative and the executive branch is annulled since the executive power gains the upper hand in the composition and substance of the legislature. Besides, The basic law (Grundgesetz) provides MPs with indemnity in their voting behaviour and guarantees to them immunity from punishment for certain acts which other citizens would not be able to get away with. This relative freedom and independence of MPs is corrected by the rule books on the behaviour of MPs which envision the necessity of their ethic conduct. The violations of the rules are sanctioned not so much by moderatorial law as by political means. The author’s opinion is that deciding on their own affairs cannot be universally granted to parliaments. Constitutions allow, even call for, certain decisions on one’s own affairs to be made. However, due to insufficient outside control, self-control must be increased, which implies legal obedience on the part of MPs so that laws become meaningful for all participants. Besides the ethic and political pressures which force the MPs to behave in a law-abiding manner, laws also exert positive pressure on them to see to it that their decisions serve the public good.
Keywords
Hrčak ID:
26845
URI
Publication date:
15.2.2001.
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