Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2080743
Firms’ re-innovation after failure and institutional environment: an evolutionary game theoretical approach
Zhuang Xiong
Pengju Wang
Lingling Wang
Abstract
Carrying out follow-up innovation activities is significant to
encourage firms with failed innovation to improve their innovation
quality and sustainable competitiveness. However, the existing
studies lack discussion on how to stimulate firms’ reinnovation
after failure from the institutional level. To explore the
relationship between institutional environment and the behavior
choice of firms’ re-innovation after failure, the behavior characteristics
of firms’ re-innovation after failure were discussed. A game
model between government departments and firms with failed
innovation was constructed by using the evolutionary game
approach. The stable equilibrium strategies in the process of institutional
environment optimization and firms’ re-innovation decision-
making after failure were analyzed. Meanwhile, the case of
Zhengzhou in China was used to illustrate the theoretical model.
Results show that the subjective perception of risk and benefit of
re-innovation affects the behavior choice of firms’ re-innovation
after failure. The increase of re-innovation income promotes reinnovation
behavior after failure and enhances firms’ competitiveness.
The improvement of intellectual property protection
improves re-innovation income, but the reduction of re-innovation
cost has a limited impact on the behavior choice of firms’
re-innovation after failure. The increase of government social welfare
benefits promotes the institutional environment construction
and firms’ willingness to re-innovate after failure.
Keywords
Firms with failed innovation; re-innovation after failure; institutional environment; evolutionary game
Hrčak ID:
303759
URI
Publication date:
31.3.2023.
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