Original scientific paper
Small states and Constitution making: The causes of different outcomes in Philadelphia and Bruxelles
Robert Podolnjak
; Faculty of law, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
Abstract
The theme of this article is the analysis of the possible causes of different outcomes regarding the conflict between large and small states in two constitutional conventions: the American Federal Convention held in Philadelphia in 1787 and the Convention on the Future of Europe held in Brussels in 2002-2003. In both conventions this was the central issue. This conflict was relevant in Philadelphia regarding the resolution of issues on the representation and voting power of the states in Congress and on some other institutional issues (the Electoral College, the veto on the laws of the states, Senatorial powers, amendments) and in the European Convention on similar issues of voting power of states, and the composition or leadership in certain bodies (the Commission, the European Council). The small states in the Philadelphia Convention achieved success in defending the principle of equality of states primarily through equality in the Senate and obtained some other important victories. This success in the process of 'arguing and bargaining' was primarily the result of four interrelated factors: favorable rules of the game (voting by the states), the voting strength of the small states and their cohesion and firmness throughout the Convention, their unyielding bargaining position as to the principle of equality of states and credibility of their threats that they would not ratify the Constitution under the terms imposed by the large states. When analyzing the conflict between the large and small states in the European Convention it is obvious that the position of small states was institutionally weaker (the representatives of states were in the minority in the Convention's membership as they were only one of several institutional components; the majority of small states were accession states, which had no right to challenge a 'consensus' of the Convention) and were procedurally weaker (the rules of the game were against them, because they were imposed and manipulated by the Presidium, dominated by large states; ¬¬voting, which could demonstrate their possible strength, was forbidden). Finally and very importantly, the small states were not coherent and united in pursuing their goals, they were not firm in the defense of the principles they had declared at the beginning of the Convention, and at the end they did not use credible threats, as was the case with the small states in Philadelphia. These are the fundamental causes for the failure of the small states in the European Convention to secure institutional solutions which they favored.
Keywords
constitution making; Philadephia Convention; Convention on the Future of Europe; large and small states
Hrčak ID:
51984
URI
Publication date:
24.4.2010.
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