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Bošković's Doctrine about Finality — a Valuable Contribution to Metaphysics

Miljenko Belić ; Filozofski fakultet Družbe Isusove u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska


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Abstract

Boskovic did not expose his doctrine about finality in a separate work but interweaved it into other his reflexions, especially into those dealing with God.
In the first part of this article Boskovic's doctrine about the source of the determination of happenings in the world is expounded. He solves this question both mathematically and metaphysically in two ways: dependently and independently on his own theory of the composition of matter. This article brings also a short critical review.
Then, in the second part, before producing Boskovic's opinion on finality, the contemporary attitudes about those problems are considered, i.e. about finality and teleology respectively (teleonomy, programme). The attitudes on that are expounded: those spontaneous (prescientific, prephilosophic), agnostic, monistic (especially the standpoint of A. I. Oparin) and metaphysical (i.e. what is the function and, consequently, what characteristics are of that being which brings the determination where such determination is necessary).
Now, in the third part, we weigh out the value of Boskovic's contribution in the fact that he directed the research about finality on the research about necessity, respectively nonnecessity of the determination in the world and, consequently, on the quest of its source. Treading on that road Boskovic came to the conclusion that the determination of the world has no origin in itself, but in the infinite reason, will and power, which by bringing the determination is not only the adjuster of the world but the bearer of the fundamental possibility and therefore the Creator in the literal sense of the word.

Keywords

Hrčak ID:

53768

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/53768

Publication date:

20.8.1987.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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