Izvorni znanstveni članak

https://doi.org/10.31337/oz.80.1.1

Some (Wittgensteinian) Remarks on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

Borut Cerkovnik ; Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Ljubljani, Ljubljana, Slovenija

Sažetak

I argue in favor of a distinction between human understanding and machine “understanding”. Based on Wittgenstein’s view on machines and his considerations on understanding, I aim to demonstrate that no machine with artificial intelligence can reach functional equality with human beings. In particular, this also holds for ethical praxis because it consists of an extremely blurred net of language– games, guided by ethical rules. Therefore, a machine can never have the human ability (disposition) to act ethically and cannot be a moral agent.

Ključne riječi

Wittgenstein; artificial intelligence; applied ethics; understanding; human; robot; machine

Hrčak ID:

326914

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/326914

Datum izdavanja:

17.1.2025.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 297 *