Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.26.76.4
Two Kinds of Conceptual Engineering
Walter Veit
orcid.org/0000-0001-7701-8995
; University of Reading, Reading, UK
*
Heather Browning
orcid.org/0000-0003-1554-7052
; University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
* Dopisni autor.
Sažetak
The last decade has seen an explosion of meta-philosophical work on conceptual engineering. Beyond simple analysis of concepts, conceptual engineering allows for evaluation and improvement of concepts accord- ing to the purposes for which they will be used. This paper sketches a pluralist account of conceptual engineering and provides a distinction between two different and often conflicting kinds of conceptual engineer- ing: naturalist conceptual engineering (NCE) and moral conceptual en- gineering (MCE), distinguished not by their methods, but by their roles, functions, and purposes. Using the examples of health and animal wel- fare, we demonstrate the application of both MCE and NCE and show how the different contexts in which a concept is used can create con- flicting demands but also how concordance between these demands can strengthen a concept.
Ključne riječi
conceptual engineering; explication; ameliorative analysis; animal welfare; health; ethics; naturalism
Hrčak ID:
345571
URI
Datum izdavanja:
19.3.2026.
Posjeta: 711 *