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Content, Mental Representation and Intentionality: Challenging the Revolutionary Character of Radical Enactivism

Pierre Steiner ; University of Technology of Compiègne - Sorbonne Université, France

Sažetak

Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by
overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and
classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in
at least two respects: fi rst, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical
alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second
by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in
agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental
content and intentionality. In order to expand and exemplify these ideas,
this paper presents two heterodox positions on intentionality and on the
relations between content and representation. Special attention is paid
to the way REC is rejecting these positions: I argue that this rejection reveals common assumptions with classical representationalism, but also
undermines the coherence of REC’s conception of intentionality.

Ključne riječi

Content; intentionality; mental representation; radical enactivism; 4E cognition

Hrčak ID:

253600

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/253600

Datum izdavanja:

31.3.2019.

Posjeta: 939 *