Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.26362/20210202
Convergence argument against the challenge of “unconceived alternative theories”
Amir Hajizadeh
; Amirkabir University of Technology, 424 Hafez Ave, Tehran, Iran
Sažetak
Kyle Stanford (2001, 2006a) poses a new challenge to scientific realism, known as the “new pessimistic induction.” According to him, for each theory chosen by scientists, a class of theories exists with radically distinct ontological claims but equal explanatory power. Therefore, no theory can be considered as the only theory or the best theory. As a result, the realistic approach to its unobservable entities is unjustified. This paper tries to use the idea of convergence against this challenge. The first part of the paper emphasizes that, according to the new pessimistic induction, given the unlimited number of unconceived alternative theories for each successful theory, the possibility of “encountering” and “uniting” independent theories will be very unlikely. Meanwhile, the history of science recurrently displays convergence and multiple discoveries. In the second part, an attempt is made to respond to the general critiques of the idea of convergence.
Ključne riječi
Kyle Stanford; unconceived alternative theories; pessimistic induction; scientific realism; convergence
Hrčak ID:
267576
URI
Datum izdavanja:
18.12.2021.
Posjeta: 850 *