Izvorni znanstveni članak
Gettier’s Counterexamples and the Analysis of Knowledge
Zvonimir Čuljak
Sažetak
Contrary to the received view, I argue that Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified true belief failed, because the justification condition and especially truth condition for knowledge in these cases are not unambiguously fulfilled. For the propositions believed are semantically ambiguous and cannot be clearly said to be either true or false and, therefore, to be the objects of justified true beliefs. This is due to the puzzling semantic role played by a definite description (in the first counterexample) and an exclusive disjunction (in the second counterexample). Therefore, neither of Gettier’s alleged counterexamples does in fact refute the tripartite analysis as such, but only an interpretation of it. Gettier’s cases can be at best construed as demanding a modification and improvement of the traditional analysis and not as demanding its replacement. Some other Gettier-like cases, e.g. those proposed by Lehrer and Feldman, can be treated in an analogous manner.
Ključne riječi
Knowledge; belief; justification; truth; Gettier; analysis of knowledge; epistemology; semantics; definite descriptions
Hrčak ID:
226
URI
Datum izdavanja:
8.12.2003.
Posjeta: 3.043 *