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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 5 No. 2, 2009.

Izvorni znanstveni članak

From tracking relations to propositional attitudes

Adam Morton ; University of Alberta

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 115 Kb

str. 7-18

preuzimanja: 392

citiraj

Sažetak

I explore the possibility that propositional attitudes are not basic in folk psychology, and that what we really ascribe to people are relations to individuals, those that the apparently propositional contents of beliefs, desires, and other states concern. In particular, the relation between a state and the individuals that it tracks shows how ascription of propositional attitudes could grow out of ascription of relations between people and objects.

Ključne riječi

propositional attitudes; psychological relations; content

Hrčak ID:

63459

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/63459

Datum izdavanja:

1.12.2009.

Posjeta: 1.052 *