Izvorni znanstveni članak
Cognitive And Heideggerian Approaches To The Question: What Is The Object Of Objectless Fear?
Kevin Sludds
; Institute of Technology Sligo
Sažetak
In this article I will detail the short-comings that exist in the cognitive account of the emotion objectless fear, principally, though not exclusively, as it is presented in the work of William Lyons. I will use my critique of Lyons’s causal-evaluative theory to act as a point of transition or pathway towards Heidegger’s description of Angst as it is detailed in Being and Time. I argue that objectless fear cannot simply be dismissed as a mislabelled mood, as claimed by Martha Nussbaum or, as Lyons suggests, that its object is merely vague or imponderable. Rather, it is my contention that genuine objectless fear (or Angst) is best understood as an ontologically important means of revealing our authentic and inauthentic possibilities.
Ključne riječi
emotion/mood analysis; objectless fear; Angst; cognition; causal-evaluative theory; Martin Heidegger; Being and Time; ontology
Hrčak ID:
70320
URI
Datum izdavanja:
12.7.2011.
Posjeta: 913 *