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Trivializing cognitive command
Tommaso Piazza
Sažetak
In this paper I criticize Wright’s claim that Cognitive Command is a significant test for discerning realist from antirealist discourses. The antirealist semantics explicitly advocated by Wright, entails that every discourse whose truth predicate is superassertibility exerts Cognitive Command, and so that every assertoric discourse deserves a realistic treatment. Whenever two disputants disagree as to the truth value of a sentence expressible within the discourse, provided that they master the relevant vocabulary, they must have committed a cognitive mistake. For they disagree as to the warranted assertibility of the sentence in the light of the available evidence: hence either one of them (or both) misrepresents it, or one of them (or both) fails to to take into account its evidential status.
Ključne riječi
Cognitive Command; Truth; Crispin Wright; Realism/Antirealism
Hrčak ID:
91124
URI
Datum izdavanja:
10.11.2005.
Posjeta: 847 *