APA 6th Edition Sie, M. (2005). Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 1 (2), 67-82. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/91125
MLA 8th Edition Sie, Maureen. "Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 1, br. 2, 2005, str. 67-82. https://hrcak.srce.hr/91125. Citirano 16.04.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Sie, Maureen. "Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1, br. 2 (2005): 67-82. https://hrcak.srce.hr/91125
Harvard Sie, M. (2005). 'Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 1(2), str. 67-82. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91125 (Datum pristupa: 16.04.2021.)
Vancouver Sie M. Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2005 [pristupljeno 16.04.2021.];1(2):67-82. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91125
IEEE M. Sie, "Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.1, br. 2, str. 67-82, 2005. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91125. [Citirano: 16.04.2021.]
Sažetak In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence — e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’- like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.