APA 6th Edition Pavić, R. (1996). Problem dijela istočne Hrvatske: UNTAES - nada i realnost. Politička misao, 33 (4), 169-188. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/105866
MLA 8th Edition Pavić, Radovan. "Problem dijela istočne Hrvatske: UNTAES - nada i realnost." Politička misao, vol. 33, br. 4, 1996, str. 169-188. https://hrcak.srce.hr/105866. Citirano 05.03.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Pavić, Radovan. "Problem dijela istočne Hrvatske: UNTAES - nada i realnost." Politička misao 33, br. 4 (1996): 169-188. https://hrcak.srce.hr/105866
Harvard Pavić, R. (1996). 'Problem dijela istočne Hrvatske: UNTAES - nada i realnost', Politička misao, 33(4), str. 169-188. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/105866 (Datum pristupa: 05.03.2021.)
Vancouver Pavić R. Problem dijela istočne Hrvatske: UNTAES - nada i realnost. Politička misao [Internet]. 1996 [pristupljeno 05.03.2021.];33(4):169-188. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/105866
IEEE R. Pavić, "Problem dijela istočne Hrvatske: UNTAES - nada i realnost", Politička misao, vol.33, br. 4, str. 169-188, 1996. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/105866. [Citirano: 05.03.2021.]
Sažetak International pressure prevented Croatia from ending the occupation of eastern Slavonia by military means. The author claims that the policy of peaceful integration and the UNTAES mandate are rife with risks which might jeopardize the eventual Croatian control of that region. He points out a set of contentious issues related to the occupied territory: the incomplete demilitarization, dual government (parallel UNTAES and Serbian authorities), no return for the non-Serbian refugees, staying on of the Serbs from other parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. Particularly risky for Croatia are the efforts of the local Serbs to retain absolute ethnic majority as the grounds for establishing territorial autonomy which would enable the militant accolytes of Greater Serbian politics to remain in the region and push for the secession and annexation by Serbia, the efforts which would in all probability be given military support by Serbia, this time under the circumstances which would be much more unfavourable for Croatia than in 1995. The author concludes that for Croatia the only acceptable solution is the total integration of eastern Slavonia and the establishment of full Croatian sovereignty while the creation of a Serbian autonomous province in that region must on no account be permitted.